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Ill THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

·1

11,11A

l IJC

,

H/\LL, CITY CAB COMPAl!Y,
and THE STATE INSURANCE FUND,
/\poellants,
Case No. 19345

-vSEC'O;!D WJURY FUND,

Respondent.

7\PPCAL FROM AN ORDER OF THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH

STATEMENT OF THE :JATURE OF THE CASE
This case is an appeal from an order of the Industrial
comrn1ss1on confirming the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
La»·1 of the Administrative Law Judge.
DISPOSITION BY THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
The Administrative Law Judge confirmed the findings
,,f the rnedical panel

d1d not result

that \Vilma Hall's industrial accident

in permanent incapacity substantially greater

than she would have incurred if she had not had a number of
ere-existing conditions.
'·

~umsion,

The Administrative Law Judge, Richard

entered his Findings of Fact,

·,nd Cnder in the case on April 21,

r

1

1983.

Conclus~ons

of Law

The Industrial Commission

tah confirmed the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and

,jer and denied the State Insurance Fund's Motion for Review
' lune 29,

1983.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant, State Insurance Fund, is asking this Court

1,,

reverse the Order of the Industrial Commission insofar as
it states that the industrial accident did not result in a
permanent incapacity substantially greater than the plaintiff
would have sustained had she not had her pre-existing i ncapacit LP:,
and insofar as it denies reimbursement to the State Insurance FCJnc
from the Second Injury Fund.

The Utah State Insurance Fund

has paid approximately $12,000.00 for medical expenses and
compensation to the applicant since the industrial accident.
The finding of the Commission, that the accident did not
result in a permanent incapacity substantially greater than
that which the applicant would have incurred if she had not
had the pre-existing injuries, effectively denies the State
Insurance Fund reimbursement from the Second Injury Fund in
a case where the applicant has suffered from a long history
of pre-existing conditions that the medical panel rated as
47% whole man impairment.

The panel stated the industrial

accident increased the applicant's permanent partial impairment to 52%.
Reimbursement from the Second Injury Fund, provided for
in Utah Code Ann., Section 35-1-69, cannot be ordered unless
the applicant sustains an incapacity substantially greater
than that which she would have incurred if she had not
had pre-existing incapacities.

This statute further require-

that the pre-existing incapacity be a permanent incapacitv.
Appellant asserts that the pre-existing incapacities were
permanent and the applicant's industrial accident resulted
-2-

permanent incapacity substantially greater than that which

1

would have incurred had she not had pre-existing incapacities.

,,,~

llants seek to have the Order of the Industrial Commission
rruled and a new order entered granting appellants reimbursement according to the medical panel evaluation.

The Utah State

Insurance Fund should be reimbursed from the Second Injury Fund
for 47/52nds, or 90%, of the expenses and compensation it has

paid.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
TC"le plaintiff, Wilma Hall, sustained injuries on March
9, 1981, during the course of her employment as a cab driver,
~hen

she was struck broadside by another car (R. 18-19).

Ms.

Hall was taken to the emergency center for treatment and was
released

(R.

20).

Since the accident, Ms. Hall has suffered

'"creas1ngly severe neck, back and leg problems, and has not
returned to work

(R.

19-20).

Ms. Hall has suffered from

hypothyroid obesity for the majority of her life, weighing
on the average,
~onths

275 pounds

(R.

27).

During the first four

after the accident, Ms. Hall gained approximately 100

add1t1onal pounds

(R.

27).

In addition to the hypothyroid

obesity, Ms. Hall has suffered from angina for the past 20
'ears, for which she has been hospitalized on numerous
,·c 1::1.;1ons

(R.

30-31).

Finally, Ms. Hall suffers from

Je,1,c11erat1ve cervical arthritis of her spine
-3-

(R.

304).

The medical panel, consisting of Boyd G. Holbrook,
M.D., and Allen McFarlane, M.D., was appointed by the Inrlustr;d 1
commission to evaluate the medical aspects of the case

(R. 279J

The medical panel reviewed the file and submitted their
conclusion which stated, in part:

COMBINED DUE TO ALL CAUSES
(5)

Previously existing and concurrent physical
impairment is 47%.

(6)

The industrial accident did not result in
permanent incapacity substantially greater
than the applicant would have incurred had she
not had the pre-existing incapacity.
It is
possible that had she not had degenerative-cervical arthritis of her spine, the symptoms
in her neck at the time of her accident would
have been considerably less, would not have
been so prolonged and would not have rendered
any permanent physical impairment.
This
would be anticipated but is speculative.

Almost all of this woman's impairment is a
result of non-industrial factors.
Except for the
cervical area there is no relationship between
the industrial accident and the other medical
problems and physical impairment that she has.
The accident did not "break the camel's back"
as her extensive present disability is almost
entirely the result of non-industrial impairments.
Except for the cervical area, there is no
relationship between the industrial accident
and the other medical problems and physical
impairment that she has.
(7)

(R.

303-304)

No further medical treatment including
medications will be reasonably required in
treating the applicant as a result of the
industrial injury in the foreseeable future.
(Emphasis added).
-4-

The Administrative Law Judge, in his Findings of Fact,
~nclusions
n~dical

of Law and Order, adopted the findings of the

panel as his own, stating:
The crucial question is whether or not aside from
the cervical area there is evidence to support the
applicant's claim that the industrial injury
resulted in permanent incapacity substantially
greater than she would have incurred if she
has not had the pre-existing incapacities.
Certainly obesity in and of itself could properly
be regarded as an impairment, but it is inconceivable that obesity can be considered a oermanent
impairment in the sense contemplated by the
statute.
The Administrative Law Judge is unaware of any
Utah Supreme Court case that has required a permanent
and total disability where obesity has been a
dominant factor in the claim for disability.
Furthermore, the Administrative Law Judge is
unaware of any Supreme Court case that has required
the payment of Second Injury Fund benefits for
pre-existing conditions where the pre-existing
conditions have been unrelated to the industrial
accident.

rP.

(Emphasis added).

116-17)

These Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order
were entered by the Administrative Law Judge on June 29, 1983.
~ipellant,

the State Insurance Fund, filed a Writ of Review

with this Court on July 29, 1983.

Applicant, Wilma Hall,

f1led a Petition for Writ of Review, For Cross-~rit of Review
and Joinder in 1:rit of Review on August 1, 1983.

The State

Insurance Fund based its Writ of Review on the following
1~,r1t·~nt1ons:

-5-

1.

The Industrial Conunission acted arbitrarily and

capriciously in holding that obesity did not interact with
Ms. Hall's industrial injury to result in impairment substant1.,,
greater than she would have incurred had she not had that
preexisting condition.
2.

The Industrial Conunission acted arbitrarily and

capriciously in holding the degenerative arthritis did not
interact with the industrial injury to result in a oermanent
incapacity substantially greater than Ms. Hall would have
incurred had she not had the preexisting incapacity.
3.

The Industrial Conunission acted arbitrarily and

capriciously in finding that Ms. Ball's cardiovascular
disease, Class 1, did not interact with the industrial
injury to result in a permanent incapacity substantially
greater than Ms. Ball would have incurred without that preexisting incapacity.
4.

The Industrial Conunission acted arbitrarily and

capriciously in holding that all of Ms. Hall's combined nreexisting incapacities, equalling 47% impairment to the whole
body, did not interact with the industrial injury to result
in an impairment substantially greater than 11s. Hall would
have sustained without the preexisting conditions.
5.

The Industrial Commission acted arbitrarily and

capriciously in deciding that in Ms. Hall's case the "sllr•c;tor•'
greater" test was not met because most of Ms. Hall's incapac1t1·
were ''nonindustrial.''
-6-

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION ACTED ARBITRARILY AND
CAPRICIOUSLY IN FINDING THAT MS. HALL'S OBESITY
COULD NOT BE CONSIDERED A PERMANENT IMPAIRMENT
WHICH INTERACTED WITH THE INDUSTRIAL INJURIES TO
RESULT IN A PERMANENT INCAPACITY SUBSTANTIALLY
GREATER THAN MS. HALL WOULD HAVE SUFFERED HAD SHE
NOT I!AD THE PREEXISTING INCAPACITY OF OBESITY.
Utah Code Ann. , Section 3 ~-1-ti 9, which provides for
retmbursement for preexisting incapacity, provides in part:
If any employee who has previously incurred a
permanent incapacit:; by accidental injury,
disease, or congenital causes, sustains an industrial injury for which compensation and medical
care is Provided by this title that results in
permanent incapacity which is substantially
greater than he would have incurred if he had not
had the pre-existing incapacity, compensation
and medical care, which medical care and other
related items are outlined in Section 35-1-81,
shall be awarded on the basis of the combined
inJuries, but the liability of the employer
for such compensation and medical care shall be
for the industrial injury only and the remainder
shall be paid out of the Special Fund provided
for in Section 35-1-68(1) hereinafter referred
to as the "special fund" (Emphasis added).
This statute requires that the pre-existing incapacity be
• µermanent incapacity.
Judqe
11

did not feel that obesity could be classified as

::,~ rmanen t

ri11,j

Apparently, the Administrative Law

11

•

In his Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law

llrder ,- he states:

-7-

certainly obesity in and of itself could properly
be regarded as an impairment, but it is inconce 1 vab le~
that obesity can be considered as a permanent
impairment in the sense contemplated by the
statute .
The Administrative Law Judge is unaware of any
Utah Supreme Court case that has required a f indinq
of permanent and total disability where obesity
has been a dominant factor in the claimed disabil1ty
period.
(R.

352-53).

This is an illogical conclusion.

The applicant has

suffered from obesity and hypothyroidisM for Most of her life
and has been under a

doctor's care for this condition for some

18 years, according to the medical panel report.

\"lebster' s ::c,;

Collegiate Dictionary defines permanent as "continuing or
enduring without fundamental change."

Certainly Ms. Hall's

obesity and hypothyroidism have been "continuing and enduring
without fundamental change" for most of her life.

It seems

clear that this pre-existing incapacity is indeed a permanent
condition and that the Administrative Law Judge erred in findinq
that it was not a permanent incapacity "in the sense contemplate,;
by the statute."

Furthermore, the fact that there are no cases

to date in which obesity was a permanent pre-existing
incapacity is hardly dispositive of the issue in this case.
The Administrative Law Judge also determined that the
pre-existing condition of obesity did not result in an in1ury
-8-

_,,i,strintially greater than Ms. Hall would have sustained
,, 11 _,,,",t this pre-existing condition.

The mere numbers which

1,c medical panel included in their medical report indicate
1, 0 1

ns.

Ila 11' s obesity resulted in a permanent incapacity

,ubs~ant1ally

greater than she would have incurred from her

'"rlustnal accident had she not had the pre-existing
lOl d~idCl

3

ty

0

The medical panel stated that Ms. Hall suffered

47* pre-existing permanent partial impairment, 30% of which

was from mild hypothyroidism and obesity, and a 10%
~ermanent

partial impairment from the accident.

When these

1mpa1rments are totally co!O\bined, she has a 52% permanent
partial impairment.

Certainly, the existence of the 30%

impairment from the obesity resulted in an impairment
substantially greater than Ms. Hall would have suffered without
tr1at pre-existing condition-

Without the pre-existing

incapacity of hypothyroid obesity, Ms. Hall's impairment would
be 22% instead of 52%.

Without all of the pre-existing incapacities,

'·ls. Hall's permanent partial impairment would be 10% instead
c•f 52%. Certainly 52% permanent partial inpairment is "substantially
·:ireater" than 10% permanent partial impairment.

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
IN FINDING THAT MS. HALL'S DEGEtlERATIVE ARTHRITIS
DID NOT INTERACT WITH HER INDUSTRIAL INJURY SO
AS TO RESULT IN A PERMANENT INCAPACITY SUBSTANTIALLY
GREATER THAN SHE \'/OULD HAVE INCURRED fl_AD SHE '<OT
HAD THE PRE-EXISTING ARTHRITIS.
-9-

Both the medical panel and the Administrative Law
referred to Ms. Hall's degenerative arthritis and,

Jud~n

indeed,

both suggested that the arthritis may have increased the
injury sustained in the accident.

However, neither the

Administrative Law Judge nor the medical panel completed
its discussion of the problem.

The medical panel, in thPir

conclusion adopted by the Administrative Law Judge, states:
It is possible that had she not had the
degenerative cervical arthritis of her spine,
the symptoms in her neck at the time of her
accident would have been considerably less, would
not have been so prolonged and would not have
rendered any permanent physical impairment.
This would be anticipated but is speculative.
Almost all of this woman's impairment is a result
of non-industrial factors.
Except for the
cervical spine area there is no relationship
between the industrial accident and the other
medical problems and physical impairment she
has.
Except for the cervical area there is no relationship between the industrial accident and the othe
medical and physical impairment that she has.
On three separate occasions, the medical panel refers to
the cervical area and pre-existing problems and furthermore
indicates that the existence of the arthritis in the cervical
area probably increased the symptoms from the accident.
However, in

contradicto~y

fashion, the medical panel then

concludes that none of the pre-existing conditions interacteu
with the injuries sustained in the industrial accident.
are illogical and are internally contradictory
-10-

-~0,r

conclusion~-

The Administrative Law Judge acted arbitrarily and capriciously
,n

adopting these illogical and contradictory conclusions as
Furthermore,

the Administrative Law Judge himself

,,akes the same confusing,

contradictory, and illogical

conc:lusions when he states in his Conclusions of Law:
It is abundantly clear from the medical panel
report that the percentages assigned to the
applicant's non-industrial impairment have no
relationship to industrial accident except
as to the impairment assigned to the residual
of her cervical spine inJury.
Had the applicant
not had her pre-existing problems, the medical
panel speculated that she may not have sustained
any permanent physical impairment as a result
of her industrial accident.
Because of the
pre-existing problems, at least to a substantial
extent, the applicant does now have a 10%
residual impairment in her cervical area .
IP.

316 l .

Again,

the Judge continually refers to the fact that had

'he applicant not had the pre-existing cervical problems
cer impairment from the accident would have been less.
i'et, in complete contradiction,

the Administrative Law Judge

concludes and the Industrial Commission accepts that the preex1st1ng conditions did not result in an impairment substantially
~reciter

than she would have incurred had she not had the pre-

existing conditions.

Clearly, the acceptance of such

illogical and contradictory conclusions was arbitrary and
·cdpri<e1ous on the part of the Industrial Commission.
-11-

POINT III
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION ACTED l\RBITRARILY
AND CAPRICIOUSLY IN FINDING THAT MS. HALL'S
CARDIOVASCULAR DISEASE, CLASS I, DID NOT
INTERACT WITH THE INDUSTRIAL I~1JURY TO
RESULT IN A PERMANENT INCAPACITY
SUBSTANTIALLY GREATER THAN MS. HALL WOULD
HAVE INCURRED WITHOUT THAT PRE-EXISTING
INCAPACITY.
The hypertensive cardiovascular disease, Class 1, suffererl
by Ms; Hall was a permanent pre-existing disease that created
a resulting industrial injury substantially greater than what
would have occurred had the disease not been present.

The

very numbers expressed by the medical panel show that without
this heart disease Ms. Ball's incapacity would have been less,
her recovery capacity greater, and she would not have suffered t>.c
amount of disability she now suffers as a result of the industru:
injury.

The medical panel states that Ms. Hall's hypertensive

cardiovascular disease has resulted in a 5% permanent impajrment.
Certainly this 5% permanent impairment has interacted with the
industrial accident and the other pre-existing conditions to resu:
in a 52% permanent partial impairment.
POINT IV
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION ACTED ARBITRARILY
AND CAPRICIOUSLY IN HOLDING THAT ALL OF THE
COMBINED PRE-EXISTING INCAPACITIES, EQUALLING
47% IMPAIRMENT TO THE WHOLE BODY, DID NOT
INTERACT WITH THE INDUSTRIAL INJURY TO RESULT
IN AN IMPAIRMENT SUBSTANTIALLY GREATER THAN
THAT MS. HALL WOULD HAVE SUSTAINED \VITHOUT
THE PRE-EXISTING INCAPACITY.

-12-

All of Ms. Hall's pre-existing incapacities worked together
t,,

rc>sult in an industrial injury substantially greater than

""Id have existed had the pre-existing incapacities not been
~r~sent

and working in tandem.

1 ncapacities,

Without all the pre-existing

Ms. Hall's permanent incapacity would be 10%

instead of 52%.

Ms. Hall could have recovered more quickly

and easily from her injuries and would have been able to return
t,J

work.

The very numbers presented by the medical panel

demonstrate that the Administrative Law Judge and the Industrial
commission acted arbitrarily and capriciously in finding that
Ms. Hall's pre-existing injuries did not interact with her
industrial injury to result in an incapacity substantially
greater than she would have incurred without the pre-existing
incapacities.
POI!lT V
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION ACTED ARBITRARILY
AND CAPRICIOUSLY IN DECIDING THAT IN MS.
IIALL'S CASE THE "SUBSTANTIALLY GREATER" TEST
WAS NOT MET BECAUSE MOST OF MS. HALL'S
INCAPACITIES WERE NON-INDUSTRIAL.
The Administrative Law Judge in this case merely adopted
the medical panel conclusion that the "industrial accident did
not result in permanent incapacity greater than the applicant
~ould have incurred had she not had the pre-existing incapacity."

1elther the Administrative Law Judge nor the medical panel
-~ula1ned which pre-existing incapacity they were talking about
1

n reaching this conclusion.

The medical panel and the Judge
-13-

seemed to say that the single pre-existing condition from
which Ms. Hall suffered fell into one major category of
obesity.

This is not the case.

Aggregation of all pre-

existing conditions to determine whether the substantially
greater requirement is met is improper because each may
react with the industrial accident differently and cause
a different result.

Each separate incapacity must be

examined individually to determine if the industrial injury
was substantially greater because that incapacity was present.
In making this examination of separate pre-existing incapacities,
it is clear that even if Ms. Hall had had only one of these
pre-existing incapacities, she still would meet the substantial!;
greater requirement.
In assessing whether the substantially greater test is
met, it must first be determined exactly what that test

~eans.

Neither the Administrative Law Judge nor the medical panel
adequately explained what they thought "substantially greater"
meant, despite the fact that such a request was made to the
panel.

The panel's reasoning, adopted by the Judge, seems

to be that because Ms. Hall's present disability is a result
of non-industrial factors, the substantially greater test was
not met.

This, however, is not the test for substantially

greater.
As explained in Intermountain Smelting Corp. v. Capitano,
610 P.2d 334 (Utah 1980), and Kincheloe v. Coca Cola Bottlino
656 P.2d 440 (Utah 1982), the fact that the recent industrial
-14-

1

niucy is not related to the pre-existing incapacity is not

115 positive
,5

of the question of whether the industrial injury

substantially greater than it would have been without the

cr~-existing

incapacities.

The test requires only that the

1 udge determine whether the incapacity resulting from the

industrial accident is substantially greater because the
pre-existing conditions are present, so long as the preexisting conditions are a result of disease, injury, or
congenital cause.

The test does not require the judge to examine

whether the pre-existing condition is mostly a result of
industrial factors.
Health Care,

The Utah Supreme Court, in Intermountain

Inc. v. Ortega, 562 P.2d 617

what is meant by "permanent incapacity

(Utah 1977), explained
. substantially greater

than if the pre-existing incapacity is nonexistent."
c~se

In that

the applicant suffered from a pre-existing psychological

condition relating to pain in his back.

A back strain resulted

in a medical panel determination that he had a 30% permanent
partial disability with 10% of that pre-existing and 20% due
to an industrial incident.

The Court explained:

The requirement that the pre-existing condition
combines with a later injury as a "substantially
greater" incapacity does not mean that the former
must be greater than the latter.
It simply means
that it be some definite and measurable portion
of the causation of the disability.
It surely cannot be doubted that 30% is
substantially greater than 20%, that the 10%
disability is itself substantial but that it
is definite and measurable.
Consequently,
inasmuch as it appears that the pre-existing
condition increased the resulting disability
by one-third, it follows that under the
-15-

requirements of the statute, the medical expenses
as well as the compensation awards should have
been apportioned two-thirds from the employPr
and one-third from the special fund.
Id., at 619.
In applying the substantially greater test, it is obvious
that the disability suffered by Ms. Hall due to the industrial
injury is greater because of her pre-existing conditions.
Certainly 52% is substantially greater than 10%.

These pre-

existing conditions prevented her from recovering normally
from the industrial injury, and due to this failure to recover,
she has been unable to, and probably never will, return to
work.

Ms. Hall's permanent incapacity was substantially greater

than it would have been had she not had the pre-existing
conditions.

This conclusion is borne out by the numbers.

The Administrative Law Judge acted arbitrarily and
capriciously in adopting the medical panel finding that Ms.
Hall's pre-existing conditions did not result in a substantially
greater incapacity than she would have incurred without those
pre-existing conditions.
POINT VI
THE INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT RESULTED IN A PERMANENT
PARTIAL INCAPACITY SUBSTANTIALLY GREATER THAN
WHAT WOULD HAVE EXISTED WITHOUT THE PREEXISTING INCAPACITIES; THEREFORE THE INDUSTRIAL
COMMISSION ACTED ARBITRARILY AND CAPRICIOUSLY
IN NOT ORDERING REIMBURSEMENT TO THE STATE
INSURANCE FUND FROM THE SECOND INJURY FUND Ill
AN AMOUNT EQUAL TO THE PERCENTAGE OF THE
PERMANENT PARTIAL DISABILITY ATTRIBUTABLE TO
THE PRE-EXISTING CONDITIONS.
-16-

This Court's interpretation of Section 35-1-69 has consistently
allnwed contribution from the Second Injury Fund for all types of
"orKcr compensation payments in an amount equal to the
""rcentage of permanent partial disability attributable
to any pre-existing condition.
Steel Corp., 551 P. 2d 504

McPhie v. United States

(Utah 1976); Intermountain

Hedlth, Inc,, v. Ortega, 562 P.2d 617
Industrial Commission, 604 P.2d 478

(Utah 1977); White
(Utah 1979);

Intermountain Smelting Corp. v. Capitano, 610 P.2d 334 (Utah
19801; Paoli v.

Cottonwood Hospital, 656 P.2d 410

(Utah 1982);

cnited States Fidelity & Guarantee Company v. Industrial Commission,
r;47 P.2d 754

(Utah 1983).

Although Section 35-1-69 was amended

in 1981, the Legislature did not state that the amendment was
retroactive.

Therefore, the insurance carrier should be reimbursed

for all benefits paid.

The pre-1981 statute is applicable

r,cre since the injury involved occurred on !larch 9, 1981,
and those amendments did not go into effect until March 12, 1981.
In Intermountain Health Care, this Court held that
Section 35-1-69 required proportionate contributions from the
special fund

(the Second Injury Fund)

for compensation

and medical benefits in cases involving pre-existing injuries.
Th"' Commission found that the claimant had a partial disability
of 30%; 10% attributable to pre-existing psychological conditions
1nd 2oi attributable to an accident which occurred on the job.
fhp

Commission failed, however, to require the Second Injury

Fur1d
1',,urt

lo pay its proportionate share of medical expenses.

This

found that Section 35-1-69 required the Second Injury Fund
-17-

to reimburse the insurance carrier for one-third of the medical
expenses and compensation because one-third of the employee'
permanent partial disability was attributable to the rre-en
condition.

~t_

1,

In the instant case, the numbers presented by t lw

medical panel indicate that 47% of the applicant's
is attributable to pre-existing conditions.

disabilit~

Therefore, the

Second Injury Fund is obligated to reimburse the State InsurancE
Fund for a percentage of benefits and medical expenses, which
the State Insurance Fund has paid to the applicant equal to
that percentage of permanent partial disability attributable
to the applicant's many pre-existing conditions.
This Court extended the holding of Intermountain Health
Care to cover temporary total disability compensation in the
case of White v. Industrial Commission, 604 P.2n 478
1979).

(Utah

The Court consolidated several cases, each of which

depended upon judicial construction of Section 35-1-69.

In

each case the Court held the Second Injury Fund must reimburse
the insurance carrier for a proportion of medical expenses and
temporary total disability compensation equal to the oercenta0e
of permanent partial disability applicable to the pre-existing
injury.

In the instant case, the State Insurance Fund has paiJ

a substantial amount in medical expenses and temporary total
disability and permanent partial disability, and the Fund shoulJ
be reimbursed for that portion of these payments equal to the
-18-

rercentage of the impairment due to the applicant's pre-existing
inrapac1 ties.
In Intermountain Smelting Corp. v. Capitano, 610 P.2d 334
1

uuh 1980), this Court again held that the Commission erred in

'rcler

ing the employer to pay all medical compensation and temporary

total disability benefits when a portion of the disability

was attributable to a pre-existing injury.

In that case, the

Court stated:
We think that the reasonable conclusion to be
drawn therefrom is that the employer is responsible for only the percentage of compensation
and medical care which the injury occurring in
the employment bears to the applicant's total
disability.
This conclusion is also borne out
by the final provision that any amount which
has been paid by the employer in excess of the
portion attributable to the industrial injury
should be reimbursed to him out of the special
fund.
Id.

at 337.
Section 35-1-69 was amended in 1981.

Though the 1981

anendments do not apply here, this Court's interpretation
of the statute even after those amendments indicates the
~eneral

purpose and structure of the Second Injury Fund

requires that it reimburse the insurance carrier for all
expenses and disability paid out.
& Guarantee Co.

v.

In United States Fidelity

Industrial Commission, 657 P.2d 754

1983), this Court interpreted 35-1-69, as amended.

(Utah

Thougn

lhdt case involved several statutes and a fairly complicated
tact situation,

the Court discussed the implication and purpose

·' Section 35-1-69:
-19-

Explicit statutory authority exists to
apportion compensation awards and medical
costs between the employers and the Second
Injury Fund, provided certain conditions
are met.
Basically those conditions are
three in number:
( 1) Permanent incapacity
of the employer is assessed on "the basis of
the percentage of permanent physical impairment attributable to the industrial injury
only and the remainder shall be paid out of
a said special (Second Injury) fund.
Id., at 767.
In the instant case,

the State Insurance Fund has paid

temporary total disability, medical expenses and permanent
partial disability due to the industrial accident of approximate'
$12,000.00.

Since the medical panel itself found that 47' nf

Ms. Hall's impairment was due to pre-existing incapacities, the
State Insurance Fund should be reimbursed from the Second In i un·
Fund for 47/52nds or 90%, as is described in the statute and
relative case law.

CONCLUSION
The Administrative Law Judge and the Industrial Commission
acted arbitrarily and capriciously in adopting the medical panel''
conclusion that the industrial accident did not result in
permanent incapacities substantially greater than Ms. Hall
-20-

wnuld have

incurred had she not had the pre-existing
The findings were internally contradictory.

,P

clcn1al of the State Insurance Fund's Motion for Review
111 be reversed.

The State Insurance Fund respectfully

c"guests this Court remand this

case to the Industrial

so that they may make an appropriate determination

':o~cmiss1on

cE the amount of reimbursement the State Insurance Fund should
r•ce1~e

from the Second Injury Fund.

1·{espectfully submitted this ____ day of December, 1983.
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